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The Growth of the Western Region

2

The history of new state movements in America is always an
absorbi~g

study; the character of the settlers and the compelling

factors that motivate them are revealed with startling clarity
as the reader turns the pages back into the annals of the period.
The history of America has been, in a large degree, says Frederick

J. Turner, "the history of the colonization of the Great West.
The existence of an area of free land, its continuous recession,
and the advance of American settlement westward, explain American
development."
In no state was the influence of the frontier advance upon
political development shown more clearly than in
first settlement on the "western waters."

~entucky,

the

It is a significant

feature of this statehood struggle that it did not concern itself
with purely local considerations but found its greatest impetus
in a problem of national importance, the free navigation of the
Mississippi.

It is the purpose here to consider the inter-

relation of these two questions and Kentucky's role in their
solution.
The migrations to the district were made despite the great
distance from the older settlements, despite the menace from the
Indians, and in constant disregard of the fact that Virginia
could give neither adequate protection nor aid to those who dared
to take up the life of the pioneer.

It is not the purpose here

to follow the story of the development of the settlement, but it
is necessary to attempt to discover, if possible, the nature and
the number of those who were so vigorously to influence the
history of the western district.

3

John Filson, who was to become the first of the recorders
of the history of Kentucky, said:

"We may conclude that Kentucky

contains, at present (1784), upwards of 30,000 souls, so amazingly

r~pid

has been the settlement in a few years.

Numbers are

arriving daily, and multitudes expected this Fall, which gives
a well-grounded expectation that the country will be exceedingly
populous in a short time.

The inhabitants, at present, have

not extraordinary good houses., as usual in a newly settled country."l
The close of the Revolution found a considerable part of
the district surveyed and rapidly being taken up by grants.
Real estate was being bought and sold, towns were laid out and
began to assume respectable size.

There was every evidence of

permanency and healthy development, though the communities had,
in no phase, lost their pioneer nature. 2

Filson's estimate

of 30,000 inhabitants is greater than the number attributed to
the district by more recent historians, but of more importance
than numbers, in any given year, was the fact of rapid and
permanent growth. 3
It is necessary to oonsider, also, that the district did
not offer sufficient lure to retain all who came into its
borders.
1.

2.
3.

"Perhaps from ten to twenty thousand people a year,"

Reprinted in Mississippi Valley Historical Proceedings,
Vol. VI, p. 112, from Filson, Discovery, Settlement and
Present state of Kentucke, pp. 28 and 29.
(A copy of this book is in the Wisoonsin State Historioal
SOCiety Library.)
For an interesting account by a contemporary writer see
Gilbert Imlay, A Topographical Description of the Western
Territory of North Amerioa, 1793, p. 45, fr.
Justin Winsor, in his Westward Movement, Boston, 1897, p.
178, plaoes the probable number of people in the district
in 1783 at 12,000. The first Federal census, 1790, accorded to Kentucky 73677 persons.
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says Roosevelt, "came into Kentucky during the close of the
Revolutionj but the net gain to the population was much less,
because there was always a smaller, but almost equally steady,
counterf~ow

of men who, having failed as pioneers, were strug-

gling wearily back to their deserted eastern homes."4
The student of early Kentucky history is constantly impressed
with the qualities of leadership exhibited by many of those who
were coming to make this region their homes.

It is a common

tendency to idealize the pioneer and to impute to him the sterling
attributes of courage, honesty and sincerity without regard to
the fact that the same term may apply to the ignorant and
slothful individual who had drifted away from an older community.
Such men were not lacking in Kentucky but their presence was
more than offset by a vigorous, independent element, fully
capable of assuming leadership in political and economic affairs.
It is not surprising to find, then, that when differences of
interests between East and West arose, there was in Kentucky a
group that could champion ably and earnestly the interests of
their adopted section.
With the growth of population, mills began to put in their
appearance.

Their products were to require markets if expansion

was to continue.

From the settled and semi-settled areas about

the towns, beef, apples, salt and hemp promised profit to
tne man who could solve the difficult problem of sale for them.
Aggressive action and decisive steps would be necessary if the
economic future of the district was not to be thwarted and
Kentucky to remain an isolated, backward community until such
time as she would have a population sufficient to absorb her
4.

Roosevelt, Winning of the West, Vol. III, pp. 15 and 16.
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produc~s.

In no such pronounced limitations upon its develop-

ment could a pioneer community be expected to acquiesce, and
Kentucky was no exception to the rule.
From the political standpoint alone, Kentucky was experiencing no serious disadvantages.

There was no history of arbitrary

rule by Virginia -- the district was simply administered as
a county.

But as the economic disability attendant upon the

closed navigation of the

Mis s ~ssippi

became more marked,

political considerations began to loom large in the discussions
in the state.

Administration by a government removed by several

hundreds of miles and under the direction of men who were not
in touch with local matters caused the Kentuckians to feel that
their economic salvation lay in statehood.

In its simplest

analysis, then, the history of Kentucky from 1783 to 1789 is the
history of a section profoundly influenced by a movement for
statehood which had as its chief object the securing of the free
navigation of the Mississippi.

6

Kentucky and the Mississippi Question

7

The question of the control of the Mississippi River and
Valley was agitated long before there was a population in that
region sufficient to account for the interest shown.

The

foreign offices, with an ever watchful eye upon the possibility
of colonial expansion, saw the potential value of the section.
Madrid had watched with uneasiness the decline of French power
in America; their common rival, England, was developing with an
all too irresistible force her place in the New World.

To

Spain the all important problem seemed to be that of maintaining her hold upon the Gulf, both with respect to the colonies
that surrounded it and the commerce that it carried. 5

England l s

contraband trade with these colonies was increasing in an alarming fashion; aggressiveness with respect to trade might well
be followed by aggressiveness with respect to colonies.
These conditions weighed heavily in inducing Spain to
join France in her last struggle with England in America.
Spanish apprehensions had more definite grounds in the preliminary treaty of 1762 between England and France. 6

France had

agreed to cede to Great Britain the left bank of the Mississippi
as far as the River Iberville and the lakes Mauregpas and
Pontchartrain. 7
5.

6.

7.

po

This clause would establish the Mississippi

See the statement of Floridablanca, Spanish Minister of
State, to Jay, the American Commissioner to Spain (Wharton,
Diplomatic Correspondence of the Revolution, Vol. IV, pp.
145 and 146).
Spain seemed to acknowledge the possibility of the defeat of
the allies in the war with England. See Cantillo Tratados,
convenios y declaraciones de paz y de commercio, (Translated
by W. R. Shepherd in his "Ces s ion of Louisiana to Spain,"
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. XIX, p. 440.)
William MacDonald, Documentary Source Book of American
History, New York, 1916.

8

as the boundary between Louisiana and Canada and would give
to Great Britain easy access to the sea.

The possibility of

such an outlet for Great Britain upon the Gulf of Mexico
immediately awakened protest from Spain. 8
But news had come that Havana had fallen to the British
and her commissioners were in a position to demand more severe
terms.

Spain must cede Porto Rico or all the Floridas if she

wished to regain Havana.

Engl~nd

must also have freedom of

ascent as well as descent of the river " • • • • it being
distinctly understood that the navigation of the Mississippi
~iver

is to be equally free to the subjects of Great Britain

and France, in its whole breadth and extent, from its source
to the sea, and particularly that part between the said
island of New Orleans and the right bank of the river, as well
as the entrance and departure by its mouth."9
Then, suddenly, France made a most surprising move.

To

make it possible for Spain to retain Florida, France offered
Louisiana to England as a substitute.

We are perhaps well

within reason in conjecturing that France felt that she was
giving up a burdensome province.
to accept the substitution.

But England was unwilling

So with all the formality common

to such occasions Louis XV wrote a personal letter to Charles
III offering Louisiana to Spain.
were soon drawn uP.
1762, said:

The terms of the cession

The preliminary convention of November 3,

"The most Christian King, being firmly resolved

to strengthen and perpetuate the bonds of tender amity which
8.
9.

Simancas Estado, Legajo 4551, Wall, Minister of State to
Grimaldi, Ambassador to England, August 2, 1762. Translated
by Shepherd, Political Science Quarterly Vol. XIX, p. 440.
Benjamin F. French, Historical Documents of Louisiana,
New York, 1846, Vol. V, p. 240.
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unite him to his cousin, the Catholic King • • • cedes in
entire possession, purely and singly, without exception, to his
Catholic Majesty and his successors, in perpetuity all of the
country known under the name of Louisiana, as well as New Orleans
and the island in whic;h the place stands." IO
For Spain the
cause for trouble.

possessio~

of Louisiana might easily be a

There was the problem of the French inhab-

itants and there was a possibility of trouble with England
over it.

On the other hand it was not a gift to be lightly
•
rejected. The Mississippi could serve as a demarcation line
for the Spanish territories; it might be the means of checking
English advance into other western areas.

Nor was it necessary

to reckon the province of Louisiana as an economic liability;
New Orleans alone could be compensation for administrative
losses elsewhere.
To the district and state of Kentucky that was to be, the
cession was of untold consequence.

Had France retained it the

probability is that it would have become a British possession
in the period 1789-1815.

Shepherd, in his excellent study

of the cession, previously referred to, says that all conditions,
geographical, economiC, political and social, pointed to the
formation of two confederacies, one along the Atlantic seaboard
and one along the Mississippi.

With England intrenched beyond

tpe Mississippi, the history of the settlements on the "western
waters" might have taken a very different course.
The treaty between England and France was finally concluded on February 10, 1763.

"It is agreed that, for the

future, the confines between the territory of his Britannic
10.

ibid., Vol. V, pp. 235 and 236.

10
Majesty, and those of his most Christian majesty, in that
part of the world, shall be fixed irrevocably by a line drawn
along the middle of the river

ississippi, from its source

to the river Iberville, and from thence by a line drawn along
the middle of this river, and the lakes Maurespas and
Pontchartrain, to the sea; and for this purpose, the most
Christian king cedes in full right, and guarantees to his
Britannic majesty, the river and port of the Mobile, and everythin~

which he now possesses, or ought to possess, on the left

side of the river Mississippi, except the town of New Orleans,
and the island on which it is situated, which shall remain to
France; provided, that the navigation of the river Mississippi
shall be equally free, as well to the subjects of Great Britain
as to those of France, in its whole breadth and length, from
its source to the sea, and expressly that part which is between
the said island of New Orleans and the right bank of that river,
as well as the passage both in and out of its mouth.

It is

further stipulated that the vessels belonging to the subjects
of either nation shall not be stopped, visited or subjected
to the payment of any dues whatsoever." ll

Spain, through her

recent acquisition of the Louisiana country, would have this
privilege of navigation granted to France.

Conversely, Great

Britain's right to the navigation would be unimpaired by the
transfer of Louisiana.

These facts are important in the light

of later changes in the territorial status of the two countries.
During the American Revolution, Spain's diplomacy seems largely
to have been controlled by a desire to protect her Louisiana
11.

Treaty of Paris, February 10, 1763, Art. VIr (MacDonald,
Documentary Source Book of American History).
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possessions.1 2

To insure her control over that region, a rigid

domination of the Mississippi was deemed necessary.

America was

particularly anxious to secure Spanish aid during the war and
Congress, on December 30, 1776, passed a resolution:

"That if

his Catholic majesty will join with the United States in a war
against Great Britain, they will assist in reducing to the
possession of Spain the tovm and harbor of Pensacola, provided
the inhabitants of the United States shall have the free navigation of the Mississippi and the use of the harbor of Pensacola. u13
The alliance between France and Spain was the occasion for
persistent activity by Vergennes to secure cooperation from Spain.
But Floridablanca, who had recently become the chief Spanish
Minister of State, as persistently avoided the alliance. 14
Until her declaration of war against Great Britain in
1779, Spain had not concerned herself with the Mississippi
Question.

Apparently she admitted the English right to the nav-

igation, but had she not, the undeveloped nature of the western
country would have precluded controversy.

But war with England

meant the possibility of regaining Florida which would tend to
reestablish Spain in her old preeminent place in the Caribbean.
Likewise, the success of the United States would mean a more
rapid advance into the West.

Once more the Mississippi assumed

a place of importance in diplomatic considerations.
12.
13.
14.

Temple Bodley, History of Kentucky, 4 Vols., Louisville,
1928, Vol. I, p. 215 f.
Diplomatic Correspondence of the Revolution, Blair Edition,
Washington, 1837, Vol. II, p. 304.
For an account of the diplomatic manoeuvering of the three
countries, France, Spain and the United States, see Justin
Winsor, The WestWard Movement, p. 160 f.
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The official Spanish observer, Juan de Mivalles, wrote to his
home office as follows:

"Having arranged to confer in my house

and in that of the French minister with the new President of
Congress (John Jay) and various members of it, I have explored
(and the said plenipotentiary conspired to the same end) the
idea which they hold as to the territory which the Americans
have taken from the English in the interior of the province
of LouiSiana, Illinois, etc •• . • • • That the right which they
have acquired from the English by conquest would give them the
facility of exporting their produce by the Mississippi River
which flows into the Gulf of Mexico." 15
America was promised no help from France in obtaining
any of her claims to the western country.
to Congress, dated May 22, 1779, said:

Gerard, in a letter

liThe success of the war

being alone able to fix the fate of empires, it has been found
impossible , on concluding the treaty of alliance, to determine
the possessions that the United States may obtain on making
peace; consequently the engagement .o f France can only be conditional and eventual on this subject . • • • She is not now
held to any particular engagement in relation to these possessions, whether real or pretended."

He then said that "the claims

to western lands were founded only upon far-fetched inductions
subject to discussion and contradiction." l6
Though discouraged by France and receiving no hint of
support by Spain, Congress went ahead in its plans for establishing a control over the western territory.
15.
•

I

16.

•

The committee

Yela, Espana anta la independencia de los Etadns Unidos,
Vol. I, p. 387. (Reprinted in Samuel Flagg BemiS, Pinckney's
Treaty, Baltimore, 1926, p. 15.
Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence of the Revolut ion,
Vol. III, p. 174.
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appointed for the purpose presented its report upon the western
boundaries to be asked for as "Southerly as the boundary
settled between Georgia and East and West Florida; and westerly
by the River Mississippi. 17

A later report was more exact:

tiThe middle of the River Mississippi from its source to that
part of the said river which lies in latitude 31 degrees north
from the equator, then by a line drawn due east to the River
Apalachicola or Catahouche, thence to the junction thereof
with the flint river, then in a strait line to the head of st.
Mary 1 s River, and thence by a line along the middle of St.
Mary's River to the Atlantic Ocean.,,18
With reference to the freedom of navigation of the
Mississippi, the report of February 23 read:

"That the navi-

gation of the River Mississippi, as low down as the Southern
boundary of the United States, be acknowledged and ratified
absolutely free to the subjects of the United States.
"That free commerce be allowed to the subjects of the
United States with some port or ports below the southern
boundary of the said states, on the River Mississippi; except
for such articles as may be particularly enumerated.,,19
Congress, in committee of the whole, modified this to
read:

"That the navigation of the River Mississippi be

acknowledged and ratified absolutely free to the subjects of
the United States.,,20
Now that Congress was beginning to assert itself in the
matter, the next consideration would be an understanding with
17.
18.
19.
20.

Journal of the Continental Congress (1823) Vol. XIII, p. 241.
(February 23, 1779).
ibid., Vol. XIII, p. 329 (March 17, 1779).
ibid., Vol. XIII, p. 242.
ibid., Vol. XIII, p. 330.
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Spain.

A loan would be very acceptable, military aid could be

used. Perhaps we might promise them Florida for the precious
right of navigation.

On September 10, 1779, Spain declared war

on Great Britain; on September 27, Jay was commissioned to go
to Madrid and instructions were issued to him.2l

The first in-

struction stated that in case the king of Spain would accede to
the Franco-American Alliance, he should not, by any agreement,
be prevented from securing, the Floridas.

We would, in fact guar-

antee the Floridas to him if he could get them from Great Britain,
provided we were guaranteed the freedom of the navigation of the
Mississippi to the sea.

The third instruction was to obtain,

if possible, a port on the 31st parallel, on the Mississippi,
as a place of deposit for American goods. 22
Spain January 27, 1780.

Jay arrived in

He found Floridablanca willing to talk

informally but there was no indication of his intention to
recommend the recognition of the United States, nor to enter
into any contract which might imply such recognition.

The con-

ferences and negotiations entered into by Jay and the discouraging reception received by him do not concern us here.
our purpose to discover the results of his efforts.

It is

When Jay

reached Spain the Spanish campaign against Florida was well
under way.

There seemed little likelihood that the 31st

parallel would be acceptable to Spain as the northern boundary
o.f West Florida and it was even less probable that she would
yield on the Mississippi question.

Jay, in reporting a

conversation with Floridablanca said, "He then proceeded to
observe that there was but one obstacle from which he
21.
22.

Bemis, Pinckney's Treaty, p. 28.
Journal of the Continental Congress, Vol. XV, pp. 1118 and
1119.
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apprehended any great difficulty in forming a treaty with
America, and plainly intimated that this arose from the pretensions of America to the navigation of the Mississip pi.

He ex-

pressed his uneasiness on this subject and entered largely into
the views of Spain with respect to the boundaries. • • •

He

spoke amply of the King's anxiety, resolution and firmness on
this point • • • from which his Majesty would never recede."23
Jay presented the westerne~s' case when he said that, " • • •
the Americans, almost to a man, believed that God Almighty had
made that river a highway for the people of the upper country
to go to the sea by; that this country was extensive and
fertile; that the general, many officers and others of distinction and influence in America were deeply interested in it;
that it would rapidly settle, and that the inhabitants would
not readily be convinced of the justice of being obliged either
to live without foreign commodities, or lose the surplus of
their productions, or to be obliged to transport both over
rugged mountains and through an immense wilderness to and from
the sea, when they daily saw a fine river flowing before their
doors and offering to save them all the trouble and expense,
and that without injury to Spain."

Any lingering hope that

Jay might have been entertaining must have been dispelled when
he was told in an interview on September 23, 1780, that" • • •
upless Spain could exclude all nations from the Gulf of Mexico,
they might as well admit all; that the King would never
relinquish it; that the minister regarded it as the proper
object to be obtained by the war; and, that obtained he should
be perfectly easy whether or no Spain procured any other cession;
23.

Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence, Vol. IV, p. 135.
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that be considered it far more important than the acquisition of
Gibraltar. ,,24
In February, 1781, Congress altered its instructions to
Jay with reference to the navigation of the river below the 31st
parallel and on a free port below this line, but be was still
to insist upon the free navigation of the river above the point.
He protested, in a letter to Congress, that nothing was to be
gained by the lessened demands. 25 Nevertheless, he obeyed his
instructions, and presented to Spain certain formal propositions,
of which three of the articles were:
"VI.

The United States shall relinquish to his Catholic

majesty, and in future forebear to use, or attempt to use, the
navigation of the river Mississippi from the thirty-first
degree of north latitude, that .is, from the point where it
leaves the United States, down to the ocean.
"VII.

That his Catholic majesty shall guarantee to the

United States all their respective territories.
"VIII.

That the United States shall guarantee to his Catholic

majesty all his dominions in America.,,26
Jay made this offer contingent upon Spainls acceptance
if she did not accept, we would reserve the right to the
navigation.

Spain made her choice; she remained firm in her

position that the control of the Spanish dominions must not be
m~naced.

The American plea had been ably and persistently

advanced but the lure of empire was still strong in the Spanish
mind.

It was with relief that Jay received instructions to

proceed to Paris to discuss a treaty with England.
him the scene of navigation activities was shifted.
24.
25.
26.

ibid. , Vol. IV, pp. 145 and 146.
ibid. , Vol. IV, p. 743.
ibid. , Vol. IV, p. 760.

And with
Here
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agaIn Jay was forced to battle with the combination of powers
that would limit the western territory of the United States.
France and Spain worked shrewdly and systematically toward the
goal of securing for Spain the country on the east bank of the
He well knew what it would mean for the future
Mississippi. 27
of the United States if England's demand for the Northwest
country and Spain's demand for the Southwest was met.

Jay's

courageous action in entaring into direct negotiations with
England is a well-known story.

By it he avoided the danger of

America's being overwhelmed in the treaty negotiations by the
machinations of her associates in the war.
He did this in the face of a passive attitude rather widespread in the East.

While still in Spain he had received a

letter from Gouverneur Morris

~hich

in part read, " • • • The

difference between us appears to be absurd, in every point of
view, at least on our part • • • We ask a territory and a
navigation.
cannot enjoy.

The territory we cannot occupy, the navigation we
We cannot occupy this territory at present

or in future, at present because we have not the men; in future
because we cannot govern it.

The most that we can expect

is an emigration from the old world, whereof one hundredth,
or perhaps not so much, shall be our descendants, will claim
title under us to a part of the soil and then set up
independence • • •
"As to navigation of the Mississippi, everybody knows
that the current will forever prevents ships from sailing up,
however easily they may float down.
27.

NOw, unless some new

Justin Winsor, Narrative and Critical History of .the
United States, Boston, 1884, Vol. VII, p. 118.
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dragon shall be found, whose teeth sown on the banks of the
Ohio, will produce seamen, I know not where else they may be
obtained to navigate ships abroad which can never return home.
tlBut if the navigation were as easy and advantageous as it
is useless and impracticable, its effect would be only the
sooner to dissolve all commercial connections between us and
the sooner to produce every unhappy consequence.,,28
Franklin had written. in quite a different tone:

"Poor as

we are, yet as I know we shall be rich, I would rather agree
with them to buy at a great price the whole of their right on
the Mississippi, than sell a drop of its waters.

A neighbor

might as well ask me to sell my street door.,,29
The negotiations with the British were greatly influenced
by the events of the

Revolutio~ary

period.

With the discussions

narrowed down to the two parties, progress was more rapid.

On

the navigation question England was quite willing to recognize
our demands.

Article VIII of the treaty of 1783 reads:

"The

navigation of the River Mississippi from its source to the
ocean shall remain forever free and open to all the subjects
of Great Britain and the citizens of the United States."
The incomplete

kno~ledge

of the geography of the section

had given rise to the impression that the Mississippi had its
source in Canadian territory.
n~vigate

With respect to our right

to

the Mississippi to its mouth, our claim seemed to

lack substance.

England had granted us that which she did not

possess, that is, a right to the river within Spanisb territory.
Her claim to the navigation at its mouth bad been invalidated
28.
29.

Jared Sparks, Life of Gouveneur Morris, Boston, 1832, p. 225.
Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence, Vol. IV, p. 75.

19

by the loss of the southern territory to Spain.

She was now

completely removed, territorially, from the river.

By what

argument could America lay claim to Spanish waters from a treaty
with England?

A far more tenable claim was the economic

necessity of securing an outlet for

~he

western districts.

Such economic rights are usually secured by one of two methods,
aggressive action or mutual concessions.

Which course would

America take?
The general negotiations at Paris included also the British
treaty with Spain by which the latter country received Florida.
Between Spain and the United States, however, no understanding
was reached.

The boundary question and the navigation question

were to be points of contention for many more years with the
action transferred to yet anotber stage -- the United States.

20

The Movement for Statehood in Kentucky

21

As has been previously suggested the movement for statehood
in Kentucky was the result of an ever increasing conviction that
the problems confronting the district could never be solved as
long as it remained a part of Virginia.

Foremost among these

problems should be placed the necessity of securing the free
navigation of the Mississippi.

The solution of that difficulty

does not belong in this chapter but its consideration must be
kept in the mind of the reader as it was ever present in the
mind of the Kentuckian of that period.
•

ic considerations.

There were other econom-

The scarcity and depreciation of the currency,

the first resulting to a considerable degree from the isolated
condition of the region, and the second a result of Virginia
impoverisbment following the war, were evils that might
be remedied by forming a state government unhampered by the
encumbrances of an earlier day.

Again it was not a question of

Virginia's unwillingness to provide adequately for her western
county but rather of her inability to do so.
Much of the lack of knowledge in Virginia relative to
Kentucky can be attributed to the great distance intervening;
to a lesser degree the lack of understanding can be attributed
to the same cause.

The frontiersman, accustomed to meeting his

problems with prompt and decisive action, rebelled against the
slow-moving machinery of a more conservative government.

The

westerner would solve the problem of Indian attacks by vigorous
retaliation which would discourage such raids; but the Virginia
government forbade these expeditions both across the Ohio and
into the territory to the South.

Restraint and delay were

22
unappreciated elements in a land that offered so much independence
and that reckoned action preferable to inaction.
The first appearance of the new state movement was, to a
certain extent, prophetic of the future.

The situation seems

to have been marked by discontent, but discontent unaccompanied
by constructive political ideas. 30
This first separatist movement made little headway and the
later movements were

furt~ered

by a different type of leaders.

The division of the region into three counties and their
organization into a judicial district of Virginia was the outstanding political change res~lting from the early discontent. 3l
The conclusion of the treaty of peace with England was
followed by a tremendous migrati on to Kentucky.

The fact that

England had promised to give up the Northwest posts was taken
to mean less likelihood of Indian attacks.
30.

31.

p

The migration

Temple Bodley, who has contributed so much to the study of
Kentucky history, considers the movement as having been
influenced largely by those who had left eastern homes to
avoid taxation and military service and were thinking more
of disestablishing one government than of establishing
another. (Bodley, Kentucky, Vol. I, p. 279).
He prints the following petition found in the Virginia
State Library Collection (Loose) signed by fi f ty six of
the new settlers who had come out in 1780: "We must lie
under the disagreeable necessi~y of going down the
Mississippi to the Spanish protection or becoming tenants
to private gentlemen who have men employed at this juncture
in this country at one hundred pounds per thousand for running around the land which is too rough a medicine ever to
be digested by any set of people who have suffered as we have."
This prejudice of the Pennsylvania settlers against the
Virginia government and the earlier Virginia landholders
is also illustrated by t r e letter of George Rogers Clark to
his father, dated August 23, 1780, " • • • The partisans in
those countries are again soliciting me to lead them as
their Governor General, as all those from foreign states
are for a new government; but my duty obliging me to
suppress all such proceedings, I shall consequently lose
the interest of that party." (Original letter in the
Ballard Thruston collection of George Rogers Clark Papers).
William Waller Hening, Statutes of Virginia at Large,
13 Vols., Richmond, 1819, Vol. X, p. 315.
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was probably of a much higher order than that at the beginning of the decade.

It came largely from Virginia and con-

tained many officers and men from the Revolutionary armies.
But the hope of comparative security from Indian attacks was
premature.

The order of Congress cutting down the army to fifty-

five at west Point and twenty-six at Pittsburgh, together with
the unsettled conditions during the negotiations with the
Indians, produced a situa.tion filled with real danger.
Another factor contributing to the unrest was a political
one.

The desire for local self-government found in the

Holston settlements of western North Carolina and in the
Transylvania settlement in Kentucky was equally strong in this
period. 32
The particular oircumstance that produced the first definite step toward statehood was a threatened invasion by the
Cherokees in 1784.

There seemed to be little possibility of

concerted action for defense among the settlers, so Benjamin
Logan, senior colonel after the retirement of General George
Rogers Clark, issued a call to the heads of all military organizations to meet at Danville in November of that year to consider the situation.

The assembled militiaman's convention

found the immediate danger less pressing than at first reported
but recognized that the question of defense was still unsolved
~nd urgent. 33 A second convention, to meet in December (1784)
32.

For a study of "particularism" as an element in the
pioneer's social concept, see Arthur P. Whitaker, The
Spanish-American Frontier, Boston, 1927, p. 94.
33. A motion for immediate separation was made but was not
passed. This resolution read that Kentucky "when independent
ought to be taken into the Union with the United States."
(Draper MSS 11 J 37, reprinted in Littell, Political Transactions In and Concerning Kentucky).
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was decided upon and to this convention each militia company was
allowed one delegate.

At this convention a resolution to the

effect that Kentucky should be separated from Virginia and
admitted to the Confederation was passed and was ordered to be
sent to the General Assembly of Virginia.

A third convention,

to meet in April (1785) was to bring a mandate from the people.
The Journal of this Convention contains the petition sent to
Virginia as well as the address sent to the people of Kentucky,
setting forth the reasons for the desired separation.

The

petition and the address emphasized the lack of power to call
out the militia, the lack of an executive power located in the
district, and the impossibility of receiving benefits of government at so great a distance from the capital.

The address also

stressed the great difference in the economic interests of the
two sections. 34
The proceedings of the third convention indicate that the
chief motive of the early statehood demand, protection, had
given way to the broader and more deeply rooted plea of
separation for development.
Humphrey Marshall said of

th~

petition and the address:

" • • • If the petition to the legislature could be accused
of a deficient

portrait~e

of grievance; and a too great

reliance on matter of right, and a sense of duty -- the address
to the people ran some risk of falling into the opposite
extremes, and comprised under the domination of facts, a
variety of topics, presented in a drapery calculated to affect
their feelings -- awaken their fears -- and infuse into their
minds disaffection towards the existing state of things, and
34.

The Journal is printed in Littell, Political Transactions,
Appendix, Nos. I and II, pp. 61-66.
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the government of Virginia; from

th~

misdeeds of which, no longer

to be borne, they were taught to believe that a separation,
and it alone, could relieve them." 35
The resolutions adopted at the August Convention were
similar to those of the preceding convention.
resolution read:

The concluding

"Resolved, therefore, That it is the indespen-

sable duty of this convention, as they regard the prosperity and
happiness of their constituents, themselves and posterity, to
make application to the General Assembly, at the ensuing session,
for an Act to separate this district from the present government
forever on terms honorable to both and injurious to neither;
in order that it may enjoy all the advantages, privileges and
iIDIilunities of a free, sovereign and independent republic.,,36
~he

petition which accompanied the resolution likewise

seemed to embody a firm conviction of the necessity for establishing an independent state.

II

• •

• 'Tis not ill-directed or

inconsiderate zeal of a few, 'tis not that impatience of power
to which ambitious minds are prone; nor yet the baser considerations of personal interest which influence the people of
Kentucky • • • (they) are now impelled by

~xpandin g

evils, and

irremediable grievances, universally seen, felt and acknowledged,
to obey the irresistible dictates of self preservation and ·
seek for happiness by means honorable to themselves, to
-y:ou, and injurious to neither. u37

It was not to be opposition from Virginia that was to stand
35.
36.
37.

Humphrey Marshall, History of Kentucky, Frankfort, 1824,
2 Vols., Vol. I, p. 206.
The Journal of the Convention (Brown, Political
Beginnings of Kentucky, Appendix, No.3).
Littell -- Appendix No. III, p. 69.
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in the way of Kentucky's attaining her goal.

The administra-

tion problem was a difficult one for the older district and
time might well make it more serious.

In Jantary, 1786", the

General Assembly passed an act providing for the separation of
Kentucky from the mother state and the erection of the District
into a "State of the Confederation."

The will of the people of

Kentucky was to be ascertained through a convention to meet on
the fourth Monday of September 1786.

If the action of Virginia

was agreeable to the Kentuckians, the assembled convention was
to fix a date prior to September 1, 1787, when the authority of
Virginia should cease.

But in order to consummate the transfer

of authority, Congress should, before June 1, 1787, agree to
the entrance of the district into the Union as an independent
state. 38 The continuation of authorized government was provided for in the requirement that the convention of September,
1786, should call a convention to meet prior to September 1,
1787, to draw up a constitution and to provide rules and regulations for the district until that constitution should go into
effect.
But the course of separation was not so smooth.

Virginia

repealed her separation act and called for the election of
delegates to yet another convention to be held in September,
1787, to pass again upon the question of separation.

This

second act stated that "it continues to be the purpose of the
general assembly that the said district shall become an
independent state on the terms and conditions specified in the
act aforesaid" but it was apparent that the delegates "have been
38.

Hening, Vol. XII, pp. 37-40.
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hindered by unforeseen events from meeting at the time proposed
and determining the question referred to them; and it is considered that no such determination can now take place within
the time necessary for its receiving the assent of Congress
prior to the first day of June next and as required by the
act."39

In case this second act was ratified in Kentucky, then

a day not later than the first day of January, 1789, should be
selected upon which to

~ake

the transfer of authority.

The

date for the acceptance by Congress should be not later than
the fourth day of July, 1788.
In the convention of September, 1787, •

•

• • • • • • • •

with little debate it was decided, without a dissenting vote,
to be expedient for the good people 'of this district that it
should be separated from the rest of the state upon the terms
In conformity with the
and conditions prescribed by law. 40
directions of the General Assembly, an address was sent to
Congress, petitioning for the admission of Kentucky.4l
Despite the numerous and exasperating delays, the general
attitude in Kentucky seems to have been one of patient yet
persistent interest.

The address prepared by Innes, Muter,

Sebastian and Bro\vn has been quoted to indicate the wrath
of the western country.42

But the strongest statement in the

circular is no more than a vigorous protest against possible
ipdifference in Congress.

" • • • We hope to see such an

exertion made, upon this important occasion, as may convince
39.
40.
41.
42.

Hening, Vol. XII, p. 240.
Marshall, Kentucky, Vol. I, p. 275.
Littell -- Political Transactions, Appendix, No. XIII.
Humphrey Marshall and Thomas Marshall Green (The Spanish
Conspiracy) have interpreted the address as a dangerous
and inflammatory document.
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Congress that the inhabitants of the western country are united
in the opposition, and consider themselves entitled to all the
blessings of freemen, and those blessings provided by the
revolution, and will no t tamely submit to an act of oppression,
which would tend to a deprivation of jus'J:; rights and privileges."
The impatience of the frontiersman when he considers the
injustices attendant upon delay is proverbial.

Turner in

a chapter upon "Pioneer Idea ls," repeatedly emphasizes
the pioneer's irritation at the handicaps imposed upon him
by civilization which does not realize his problems.

"

• • •

the pioneer fought his way across the continent, masterful
and wasteful, preparing the way by seeking the immediate thing,
rejoicing in rude strength and wilful aChievement." 43

In

that light we "can understand the tenor of the following letter
used as a circular:

"Preparations are now making here (if

necessary) to drive" the Spaniards from their settlements, at
the mouth of the Missis s ip pi.

In case we are not countenanced

and seconded by the United States (if we need it) our allegiance will be thrown off, and some other power applied to.
Great Britain
port us.

stan~s

ready, wi t h open arms to receive and sup-

They have already offered to open their resources for

our supplies.

When once reunited to them Ifarewell, a long

farewell', to all your boasted greatness.

The province of

Canada, and the inhabitants of those waters of themselves, in
time, will be able to conquer you.

You are as ignorant of

this country as Great Britain was of America.

These hints, if

rightly improved, may be of some service; if not, blame yours elves
43.

Frederick J. Turner, The Frontier in American History,
New York, 1921, p. 270.
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•

for the neg1ect.,,44
Though irritation existed, the counsel of leadership was
for a quiet but steady prosecution of the district1s interest.
It was felt that a representative living at the capital would
help the cause of admission.

The Virginia assembly was asked

to appoint such a man and complied by selecting John Brown,
who had been a judge for the Kentucky district. 45

A resolution

to the effect that Kentucky should be admitted was prepared by
Brown and submitted to Congress February 29, 1788.

The matter

was delayed in committee, a forerunner olf the series of vexing
delays that followed.

We find that reference to the question

was made on March 4, May 30, June 2, June 3, and finally upon
July 2.

By that time word had been officially received that

the ninth state had ratified the Constitution, whereupon
Congress voted to discharge the committee appointed to look into the matter and passed the following resolution:

"

• • • •

as the Constitution of the United States is now ratified,
Congress thinks it unadvisable to adopt any further measures
for admitting the district of Kentucky into the Federal
Union as an independent member thereof under the Articles of
Confederation and perpetual Union, but that Congress think
it expedient that the said district be made a separate state,
and member of the Union, as soon after proceedings shall
c.ommence under the said constitution as circumstances shall
permi t. • • ."46
It was a terrific blow at Kentucky1s hopes for early
44.
45.
46.

Secret Journals of Congress, Vol. IV, p. 320, Boston, Wait,
1821.
Richard Collins, History of Kentucky, 2 Vo1s., Covington,
1882, Vol. I, p. 328.
Journals of Congress, Vol. IV, 830.
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admission.

The dissatisfaction which had been smoldering among

the more belligerent might now more easily be fanned into
flame.

The official proclamations likewise took on a more

assertive tone.

A convention called previous to the reception

of the news, met at Danville on July 28.
resolution adopted there reads as follows:

The preamble to the
flWhereas it appears

to the members of this convention, that the United States in
Congress
th~

assembled~

have for the present declined to ratify

compact entered into between the legislature of Virginia

and the people of the district respecting the erection of the
district into an independent state; in consequence of which the
powers vested in this convention are dissolved & whatever
order or resolution they pass cannot be considered as having
any legal force or obligation, but being anxious for the safety
and prosperity of ourselves and constituents, do earnestly
recommend to the good people inhabiting the several counties
within the said district each to elect five representatives
on the times of holding their court in the month of October
next to meet at Danville, on the first Monday in November
following, to continue in office until the first day of January,
1790, and that they delegate to their said representatives full
powers to take such measures for obtaining admission of the
district as a separate and independent member of the United
States of America, and the navigation of the river Mississippi,
as may appear most conducive to those important purposes:
and also to form a constitution of government for the district,
and organize the same when they shall judge it necessary,
or to do and accomplish whatever, on a consideration of the
state of the district, may in their opinion promote its
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interests. 1147
The wording of the resolution gives rise to conjecture.
The phrase "to take measures for obtaining the navigation
of the Mississippi" might be interpreted in whatever fashion
the reader. views the situation.

It is true that negotiations

with Spain could not legally be undertaken by the people of
the district but certainly efforts might be made to that
effect through the 'agencies of the United States.

The im-

portance attached to the free navigation of the river was no
new thing.

It had been one of the strongest elements in the

agitation for statehood.

With the news of the action of

Congress so recently received, there is small wonder that the
expression of opinion should contain vigorous mention of this
most vital subject connected with their economic welfare.

To

"form a constitution of government" was no more than to follow
the suggestion of the Virginia assembly.

With such a step

taken, a renewal of their negotiations with Congress might be
. hastened.

The decision of Congress earlier in the month had

no discouraging tone; there had been an expression of goodwill for their next effort.

Nor would the resolution to

"accomplish whatsoever. • • may in their opinion promote its
(Kentucky1s) interests," imply more than a gesture of determination to proceed along the lines previously laid down.
The action of the Convention called for the following November
would seem to bear out this contention.
The record is given minutely in the Journal of the
Convention. 48
47.
48.

Practically all of the business was carr i ed on in

Kentucky Gazette, September 6, 1788.
Full extracts may be found in John Mason Bro~1n, Political
Beginnings in Kentucky, Louisville, 1889, pp. 257-263.
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the committee of the whole.

Resolutions were offered to prepare

addresses to the Virginia Assembly and to Congress, the first
relative to separation according to the suggestion of Congress
the second with reference to possible action by Congress in
securing the navigation of the Mississippi.
not threatening.

It was vigorous, but

The even temper and well-ordered plan of the

leaders of Kentucky seem clearly given in the resolution offered by Brown.

"That it is the wish and interest of the good

people of this district to separate from the state of Virginia,
and that the same be erected into an independent member of the
Federal Union."
The ambitions of a frontier region had been thwarted
by the caution and selfishness of a more highly developed area.
But the political problem of statehood was but an indication
of a more perplexing economic problem of markets and transportation.

The demand for the free navigation of the Mississippi

could not be shelved; it was vital to the very life of the West.
And it is to that story of the West that we now turn.
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Kentuckians and Spaniards
A Study in Uncertainties

q
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When a people accustomed to the unrestrained life of the
frontier begin to evolve into an organized community, they are
likely to carryover with them into the new era their old
habits of suspicion of the outsider, of quick judgments, and of
impatience with "the law's delay."
so-called "Spanish "Conspiracy. "

Such is the story of the

It was not an insidious

intrigue, not a breaking of faith with their countrymen of the
East, but simply a collection of precipitate acts, of impulsive
statements, which maturity should have learned to tolerate in
youth.

Disgruntled individuals there were, no doubt, and self-

ish persons who would not have hesitated to sell their
country's welfare, but they were isolated cases, such as may
be found anywhere, and at any time.

The Mississippi River,

placid and unruffled ordinarily, but capable of sweeping before
it every vestige of material development when it becomes
turbulent, was the cause of this disaffection.

And as the

spring freshets can pile up its waters until it becomes a destroying force, so did the rising tide of indignation against
the East give to certain shrewd individuals a power that
threatened disaster to the region.
Jay had said that these western people believed almost to
a. man that God Almighty had made this river for them to go to
the sea by.

And when the issue was firmly established by an

order which reached Congress in June, 1784, from Madrid
reading:

"Until the limits of Louisiana and the two Floridas

shall be settled and determined with the United States of America,
his Majesty commands that you should give the states and Congress

*
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to understand that they are not to expose to process and
confiscation
the vessels which they carryon commerce on the
,
River Mississippi inasmuch as a treaty concluded between the
United States and England, on which the

fo~er

ground their

pretensions to the navigation of that river could not fix limits in a territory which that power did not possess, the two
borders of the river being already conquered and possessed by
our arms the day the treaty was made, namely the 30th
November, 1782.

This order I communicate to you that you may

conform yourself thereto."49
One letter may be quoted as an expression of opinion that
prevailed so widely in the West:

"To give us the liberty

of transporting our effects down the river to New Orleans and
then be subject to the Spanish laws and impositions, is an
insult upon our understanding.

We know, by woeful experience,

that it is in their power, when once there, to take our
produce at any price they please.

Large quantities of flour,

tobacco, meal &c have been taken there last summer, and mostly
confiscated. 1150
To present the full story of the relationship of
Kentuckians and Spaniards of this period is manifestly impossible.

Bearing in mind the fact that the rank and file of the

Kentucky people were concerned only in solving a great economic
p~oblem,

it fOllows, then, that the thing that we need concern

ourselves most with is the activities and attitudes of their
leaders.

One man of great influence, however, stands apart

from the rest.
49.
50.

Of his traitorous dealings there is little

Secret Journals of Congress, Vol. III, p. 517. (Galvez to
Rendon, June 26, 1784.
Secret Journals of Congress, Vol. IV (Foreign Affairs), p. 320.
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doubt, though his purpose has sometimes been open to question.
This ;ndividual, Brigadier-General James Wilkinson, had come
to Lexington in 1784.

He · was only twenty-six but with a wealth

of experience, not omitting intrigues, unusual for his age.
During the Revolution he had been on General Gates 1 s staff

.

perhaps ·he had received valuable lessons in double-dealing
there.

He had participated in the Conway Cabal.

The trace

of distrugt that Eastern leaders seem always to have had for
him, he

mana~ed

to dispel by an engaging manner, vigorous

personality and undeniable ability.

He came to Kentucky as the

agent of a land company but seems early to have been a t tracted
by the possibilities of the New Orleans trade.

His plans are

shrouded in the mixture of candor, duplicity and verboseness
with which

hi~

writings abound.

In July, 1787, he went to New Orleans with a boat-load
of Kentucky produce.

The prohibition upon such commerce was

well known in Kentucky; Wilkinson was certainly aware of it.
One theory to account for his action is that he meant to defy
the order, secure thereby an interview with Miro, the governor,
and win him over to his plan of a combined commercial and
political arrangement.

CommerCially, it would mean a trade

concession to Wilkinson, and to him alone.

Politically,

it would mean the promise of Wilkinson to secure a separation
-of Kentucky from Virginia and its adherence to Spain.

The

constantly growing fear in the Spanish minds of trouble with
their northern neighbors had been augmented by two inCidents,
both occurring shortly before Wilkinson 1 s trip.

I~

The first

grew out of the seizure at Natchez of a boat-load of Kentuclry
products.

North Carolina and Virginia had immediately protested

- - ~-=-----------------~--------------------------------~---
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to Congress demanding protection of their navigation rights. 51
Later Colonel Thomas Green had written a letter from Lexington
prophecying a descent upon New Orleans by the Americans.

This

letter had been intercepted by the Spaniards and presented
by Gardoqui to Jay.52

That there was a real fear among the

officials at New Orleans may be proved by the translated report
of Intendant Navarro sent from New Orleans in 1785.

He said:

" • • • The intensity with which they are working to form a city
and establish posts, and their immediate neighborhood to our
posts of the Illinois, may be harmful to us some day, unless we
shelter ourselves in time by promoting a numerous population in
this province to observe and even to restrain their intentions." 53
Whatever Wilkinson may have intended, he was eminently
successful in storming the citadel
in New Orleans.

of Spanish trade restrictions

His pleasing manner and eager frankness won

over ' the governor and the intendant, Navarro.

They listened

to his plan and they were more than impressed when, to prove
his sincerity, he offered to take an oath of allegiance to
Spain and to leave in the vault of the Spaniards the proceeds
of the sale of his first cargo.

He submitted to the authorities

a lengthy memorial which covers, in the florid manner one soon
learns to associate with the man, the whole field of American
and Spanish frontier relations.

He sketched the dissatisfaction

of the Kentuckians, the rapid growth of the West and their
rising aggressiveness.

He suggested the possibility of British

initiative, with the consequent danger to Louisiana.
51.
52.
53.

He led

Diplomatic Correspondence, Vol. VI, p. 203.
ibid., Vol. VI, pp. 199-262.
Robertson, Louisiana under Spain, France and the United
States, 1785-1807, 2 Vols., Cleveland, 1911, Vol. I,
p. 244.
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artfully to the question of whether it would not be better
for Spain "by partial indulgence and an acconnnodating deportment

II

to win the western region than to risk the danger of

their rising aggressiveness under another power.

He suggested

that Gardoqui be instructed to remain firm in his stand upon the
navigation question but that Spain might do well to remember
that "in order to conciliate and prepare the minds of the
western

Americans~

tolerance will be good politics in certain

political cases, offering it to a few parties of real influence."
Honesty and truthfulness were never serious handicaps to
Wilkinson, to judge from the memorial.

"Be it known to your

honors, that the Notables of Kentucky, the place of my residence, chafing under the inconveniences and privations they
suffer through the restrictions placed on its commerce, suggested
that I make this voyage in order to penetrate, if this were
possible, the attitude of Spain toward this country and to
discover, if this were practicable whether it would be agreeable to admit us under its protection as vassals."

Among

all the charges brought against certain prominent Kentuckians,
there is found no evidence to verify this charge that they
inspired the voyage of Wilkinson.
with three suggestions:

He concluded his memorial

First, secrecy with respect to the

plan, and his connection with it.

Second, the continuance in

qffice of Miro, as Governor of Louisiana.

Third, the appointment of Navarro to be minister to the American government. 54
The oath of allegiance is likewise in the true Wilkinson
54.

This memorial may be examined in the Louisiana State
Historical Society Publication, Vol. IX, No.1 and also in
Bodley's Introduction to "Reprints of Littell's Political
Transactions in Kentucky." These copies were obtained
from the original in the Pontalba Collection. This
.
memorial is dated August 21, 1787.
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style.

Its chief value to the student lies in its application

to the premise that insincerity and self-aggrandizement were
compelling attributes of the man.

To read it is to sUbstantiate

the conviction that Wilkinson meant to use the Spaniard1s lack
of informatiori regarding Kentucky to his own economic advantage,
to gain trade concessions upon the false impression that he
would be the means of winning the allegiance of Kentucky to the
Spanish crown.
purpose.

Nothing could have been further from his

Kentucky1s adherence to Spain would have meant the

end of his coveted trade monoply, his sole purpose in furthering
the whole design. 55
There is a tendency to magnify the influence of Wilkinson
in Kentucky and to attempt to connect all the impetuous
statements and questionable acts in that district with his
schemes.

It is true that as a vigorous and self-assertive per-

sonality he was well known, but the attitude of the leaders
toward him was not one of guilty connivance, but of appreciation
for his supposed interest in the region.
by him as New Orleans was.

To illustrate:

Kentucky was deceived
he read befope the

convention of 1788 what he purported to be his memorial to the
Spanish.

In reality it was an expurgated form of that memorial,

containing only a recital of the woes of the Kentuckians,
55.

Whitaker, in his Spanish-American Frontier, accepts the
idea that Wilkinson meant to detach Kentucky from the
Union and to join it to Spain. But all evidence seems to
point to the fact that Wilkinson meant to gain economic
advantage and not political advancement, a course that
could be best sensed by maintaining the situation as it was.
W. R. Shepherd in his article "Wilkinson and the Spanish
Conspiracy" (American Historical Review, Vol. IX, p. 490)
discussed the discovery of the Spanish translations sent by
Miro to Valdes, minister of war and treasurer of the Indies.
They are in the Archivo-Historico-Naclonale at Madrid. The
English original has never been located.
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and praying that Spain would help them by permitting New Orleans
to become their market. 56
To express their gratitude the
Convention voted this resolution:

IIResolved that this Conven-

tion highly approve the address presented by Gen'l James
Wilkinson to the Governor and Intendant of Louisiana and that
the President be requested to present him the thanks of the
convention for the regard which he there l n manifested for the
interest of the Western Country.1I 57

Wilkinson thereupon sent

a copy of the minutes, as published in the Kentucky Gazette, to
Miro, in order that Miro · might see for himself how well his
interests were being served in Kentucky.
Though Spain had not received with approval any of the
proposals presented by Jay, she was not indifferent to the
importance of a commercial understanding with America.

In

October, 1784, Floridablanca announced that he would send a
commissioner to the United States who would discuss the commercial questions, together with the Mississippi question and the
problem of the boundaries • . Gardoqui was the commissioner
selected.

Congress again chose Jay to represent America and

the discussions between these two men, abandoned two years
before, were resumed.

Gardoqui1s instructions on the boundary

question were to present a claim to the territory from the
Kentucky river west to the Mississippi.
might be made on this point.

Concessions, however,

But upon the question of the

navigation of the river, there should be no yielding.
56.

57.

To Spain

The memorial read before the convention of November 5, 1788,
may be found in Marshall, Vol. I, p. 289. The stroke was
bold enough to fix attention upon the man and to make him,
more than ever, a great power in political circles, but
stopped short of revealing how traitorous had been his
dealings in New Orleans.
Bodley, Vol. I, p. 445 (Reprinted from the Pontalba Papers)
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should go the exclusive right of navigation where it ran between
58
the Spanish banks.
Jay was especially enjoined to assert the right of the
United States "to their territorial bounds and the • free navigatioD' of the Mississippi, from the source to the ocean, as
established in the treaties with Grea t Britain. 1159.

He was not

to conclude anything until he had previously communicated
it to Congress and received the approval of that body.

At the

first -meeting Jay presented the American claim to the navigation and to the boundary line of 31 0 as set forth in the
treaty with England.
also requested.
cussions upon the

The privilege of West Indian trade was

Gardoqui intimated that there might be disterr~torial

firm upon navigation.

issue, but that Spain must stand

The Spanish commissioner sensed, evi-

dently, the difficult position in which Jay was placed.

The

southern delegates in Congress were concerned in keeping faith
with the people of the Mississippi Valley.

~here

was, in their

minds, but one important problem under discussion with Spain.
To the eastern delegates considerations of trade not connected
with western rivers were of vital importance.

Gardoqui wrote

that some "men of judgment" in Congress thought that for the
West to be too attractive would be a source of weakness for the
whole country -- that it would be better to improve the
n~vigation

of the eastern rivers and make the nearer western

regions more attractive.

Some eastern interests, he found,

were alarmed at the drain upon cheap labor.

On the other hand,

he was not at all willing to see the Westerners aroused to the
58.
59.

Bemis, pp. 74 and 75.
Resolution of July 20, 1785, Diplomatic Correspondence
(Blair Edition}, Vol. VI, p. 102.
s
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point of being a menace to Spanish settlements. 60

He proposed

to placate American sentiment on the subject of the West, by
special reciprocity tariff clauses between Spain and the United
States, and by a treaty covering commerce and boundary, but not
mentioning the navigation of the Mississippi.

That would

establish the principle of the river's being denied to everybody.61

By this time the interest in the possibility of state-

hood had assumed noticeable proportions and as shrewd an
observer as Gardoqui would not fail to be aware of the increased
prestige of Kentucky, should she gain her desire.
The weeks of conferences and discussions that followed
led finally, in the summer of 1786, to a compromise treaty
plan which was presented to Congress.

The major points were a

thirty year commercial agreement, a guarantee by each of the
territory of the other in America, agreement by Spain to
purchase each year in America a quantity of hard wood, paying
for it in cash specie, and finally an agreement by Spain to
mediate between the United States and Great Britain for our
recovery of the Northwest Posts.

It was an attempt to win the

American people to the support of a treaty with Spain without
~ecuring

the coveted navigation.

"Hard money" was scarce

in the States; the condition would be remedied by the hardwood
purchases.

The presence of the British in the

Northwes~

was an irritant to American pride; Spain promised to help,
even to the extent of force of arms, in their removal.

To

Jay the advantages of the commercial treaty were obvious,
60.
61.

Gardoqui to Conde de Galvez, Viceroy of Mexico, August
23, 1785 (Bemis, p. 84).
Gardoqui to Florldablanca, August 23, 1785 (Bemis, P. 84).
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as they were to the east.

Yet he had been too much in touch

with southern and western sentiment not to realize the value,
to them, of their claim.

To insure, if possible, the success

of the treaty in the Congress, Jay suggested that this country
forebear to use the river for thirty years.

If the demands of

the west could be amicably resisted for that period, time
would probably solve the problem.

It was a heavy price, but no

treaty with Spain would likewise be a disaster.

It must be

remembered, however, that Jay's instructions had been explicit
in the matter of navigation.

It was felt that the treaty, as

it stood, was doomed to defeat, since the Articles of
Confederation required nine votes to ratify.

Might a majority of

states repeal instructions with reference to a treaty, when
nine were required to ratify?

The discussion waxed warm;

the pent up intensity of feeling over the matter burst forth.
Jay was called upon to explain his plan.
pointed out our danger from without.

The eastern delegates

We had no army and no

navy; a treaty with Spain was imperative.

The vote was taken.

By seven states to five, Deleware being unrepresented, it was
decided to repeal that part of the instructions relative to
the Mississippi navigation. 62
On October 6, 1786, Jay wrote Gardoqui that "in consequence
of · some recent acts I find myself more in capacity than I was,
to make and receive propositions relative to certain matters
in difference between our countries.,,63
As a consequence of their renewed discussions there was
62.
63.

For the debates in Congress see the Journal of the
Continental Congress, Vol. IV.
Diplomatic Correspondence, 1783-1789, Vol. VI, p. 196.
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formed the following agreement.

"It is especially stipulated

and concluded that his Catholic majesty and the United States
are freely and in common and without any interruption from each
other, to use and navigate the said river from its source down
to the southern boundary of the said states, and that the
United States will faithfully observe the l1mitations and not
navigate or use the said river belOW,· or farther down than the
said boundary, in any part of its course through his majestiets
countries to the mouth of the river. 64
On April 4, 1787, Congress called upon Jay for a report as
to the progress being made in the· Spanish negotiations.

He

could offer no assurance of success with reference to the
Mississippi question, but was hopeful that a satisfactory
adjustment might be made about the boundary.65
fairs was growing more complicated.

The state of af-

The Annapolis Convention

had given promise of a new government.

Gardoqui had felt the

futility of the situation and had asked for a leave of absence
64.
65.

Gardoqui to Floridablanca, Confidential #12, September 8,
1786.
Censure, such as might have been expected, met these
agreements. Monroe wrote Governor Patrick Henry under
a New York date line of August 12, 1786: " • • • Upon my
arrival here in Dec r last (having been previously well
acquainted with Mr. Jay) in conversation with him I found
he bad agreed with Gardoqui to postpone the subject of
the Mississippi &c, in the first instance and to take up
that of a commercial treaty; that in this they had gone
so far as that Mr. Jay was possessed of the principles
on which he wo d agree to make it, upon condition on our
part of the forebearance of the use of the Mississippi
for 25 or 30 years. I soon found in short, that Mr. Jay
was desirous of occluding the Mississippi and of making
what he termed advantageous terms in the treaty of
commerce the means of affecting it • • • From that time,
and I had reason to believe he had begun even before
my arrival, we have known of his intriguing with the
members to carry the pOint." (Writings of Jas. Monroe-edited by S. M. Hamilton -- Vol. VI, pp. 144 and 145).
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while the new government was pending.

From that time, aside

from desultory discussions in Congress and in political
centers outside, the Jay-Gardoqui treaty was reckoned as a
hopeless issue.

It was a feeble and flickering end to a most

dramatic story in our early national history.

In it we find

the powerful influence of a remote and undeveloped region,
a prophecy of the rising importance of the West.

Though the

diplomatic contest in the East was not without its interesting
phases, it was in the West that the action was most animated,
the actors most thoroughly a part of the play, and the plot,
most subtly woven.
Miro seemed to have been thoroughly won over to the scheme
of Wilkinson and to have seen in it verification of his theories
concerning the protection of Louisiana.
1788:

He wrote to Madrid in

"The delivering up of Kentucky into his master's hands,

which is the main object to which Wilkinson has promised to
devote himself entirely would forever constitute this province
a rampart for the protection of New Spain • • •
"The western people would no longer have any inducement
to emigrate, if they were put in possession of a free trade
with us.

This is the reason why this privilege should be

granted only to a few individuals having influence among them,
as ·is suggested in Wilkinson's memorial, because on their
~eeing

the advantages bestowed on these few, they might be

easily persuaded to acquire the like by becoming Spanish
subjects.,,66
Our interest in Wilkinson, in this paper, is primarily in
66.

Despatch of January 8, 1788 -- Miro to Valdes.
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connection with his relationship -t o the disaffection among the
Kentuckians.
position,

After 1788 circumstances tended to weaken his

both in Kentucky and in Louisiana.

It was generally

believed that the admission of the district was but a matter
of a short time, upon which the major problems might wait.
He could not carry on indefinitely his double deceit and so,
as the new government of the United States was being put into
operation we find him writing:

"I discovered that the proposed

new government of the United States had inspired some with apprehension, and others with hopes -- so much so that I saw that
this circumstance would be a cause of some opposition and delay.
I also perceived that all idea that Kentucky would subject
itself to Spain must be abandoned for the present, and that
the only feasible plan to the execution of which I had to direct
my attention was that of a separation from the United States,
and an alliance with Spain, on conditions which could not yet
be defined with precision." 67
The whole episode was but another chapter in the adventurous
career of Wilkinson, an episode that was colorful but of little
real influence in the history of the West.

Where correspondence

and conferences with other Kentuckians have been proved,
they reveal only a tendency to enlist all who would work to
solve Kentucky1s problems.
i~

What these other Kentuckians had

mind, no one can definitely say.

Widely separated purposes

have been read into their letters, their transactions, and
their statements.
67.

The student can only study them for himself

Wilkinson to Miro, February 12, 1789 (Charles Gayarre,
History of Louisiana, Spanish Domination, 4 Vols., New York,
1866, Vol. II, p. 223.
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and draw his o\vn conclusions.
The evidence which has been advanced to prove the existerice of a Spanish Conspiracy centers around the activities of "
a small group of men living in Kentucky and of the delegate
" to

Congress~

John Brown.

One member of this group of in-

fluential Kentuckians was Harry Innes, Attorney-General for
the

K~ntucky

District.

Governor Randolph, on May 1, 1788, wrote

to him asking that he "institute proper legal inquiries"
concerning the infractions of peace on the part of certain
Kentuckians who had

t~ken

upon themselves the privilege of

punishing, by a raid, a group of Indians who had a short time
before made a marauding expedition upon several Kentucky
settlements.

Judge Innes replied upon July 21, 1787, acknowl-

edging the receipt of the Governor 1 s letter upon July 6th.
He expressed himself mystified as to the measures to be taken,
since he had no executive powers, and that to act in a
private capacity would render him "odious."

He did not under-

stand, he said "of whom he was to enquire, or against whom he
should institute persecution. 1I

He proceeded to describe

frontier conditions and the danger from the Indians and concluded:

liThe Indians have been very troublesome on our fron-

tiers, and still continue to molest us, from which circumstances
I am decidedly of opinion that this western country will in a
few years Revolt from the Union and endeavor to erect an
independent government; for under the present system we cannot
exert our strength, neither does the Congress seem disposed to
protect us, for we are informed that those very troops which
Congress directed the several states to raise for the defense of
the western country, are disbanded.

I have just dropptd this
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hint to your excellency for ma t ter of reflection.

If some step

is not taken for our protection a little time will prove the
truth of the opinion.,,68

Historians convinced of the existence

of a Spanish Conspiracy have made much of this letter.

There

are passages in the letter, it is true, that indicate the
possibility of a drastic move on the part of the western country.
But it would not be reasonable to assume, surely, that a man
interested in furthering a revolt would announce that intention
to the governor of his state several months in advance of the
act.

Would not a better explanation be that he wished, by

magnifying the gravity of the situation, to gain additional
consideration for the section?

Exasperation often leads to

exaggerated statements, which are not necessarily to be construed in their strictest sense.
The evidence used to prove a Spanish Conspiracy includes
also the activities of John
the Congress.

Bro\~,

d elegate from Kentucky to

His conferences with Gardoqui and the reports

made to at least two prominent Kentuckians are the basis for
this charge.
68.

Virginia Calendar of State Papers, Vol. IV, p. 322 .
Reprinted also in Bodley's Introduction to Littell,
No . X in Appendix but differing from the letter received
by Randolph in that the words "Revolt from the Union tl
are not included. The letter used by Littell was from
a copy retained by Innes, presumably the first draft, when
he dispatched his warning to Randolph. In 1806 an editorial in the "Western World ll charged four men in Kentucky,
Wilkinson, Innes, Sebastian and Brown, with having been
implicated in a separatist plot. Littell's book is written
in defense of these men, especially of Innes and Brown.
Whether Innes altered the copy of the letter submitted to
Littell or whether he had attached little importance
to the difference in the two wordings, the student must
decide for himself. The most damaging of the two manuscripts is used here, since it seems the most authentic,
but its admission as evidence does not prove a "Spanish
Conspiracy."
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The evidence rests largely on letters to two men.

To one,

Samuel McDowell, president of each of the eight conventions,
he wrote:

"In a conversation I had with Mr. Gardoqui, the

Spanish Minister, relative to the navigation of the Mississippi,
he stated that if the people of Kentucky would erect themselves
into an independent state, and appoint a proper person to
negotiate with him, he had authority for that purpose and would
enter into an arrangement with them for the exportation of their
produce to New Orleans on terms of mutual advantage."69
letter to Muter is likewise of interest,

The

"In private conferences

which I had with Mr. Gardoqui, the Spanish minister at this
place, I have been assured by

h~

in the most explicit terms,

that if Kentucky will declare her independence and empower some
proper person to negotiate with him, that he has authority and
will engage to open the navigation of the Mississippi for the
exportation of their produce on terms of mutual advantage; but
that privilege can never be extended to them while part of the
United States, by reason of commercial treaties existing between that Court and other powers of Europe.

As there is no

reason to doubt the sincerity of this declaration, I have thought
proper to communicate it to a few confidential friends in the
district, with his permission, not doubting but they will make
prudent use of the information which is in part confirmed by
d~spatches

yesterday received by Congress from Mr. Carmichael,

our minister at that court, the contents of which I am not at
69.

The above letter was quoted from memory by McDowell in a
letter published in the Palladium (Frankfort) of Augus t 7,
1806. It is reprinted in Brown, Political Beginnings,
Appendix, No. V.
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liberty to disclose.,,70

Brown continued with the statement that

the movement for statehood had gone too far to be abandoned,
and that the need for admission into the Union was too great
to await ·the long delays.

He attributed the failure to achieve

statehood at that time as due to "the jealousy of the growing
importance of the western country, and an unwillingness to
add a vote to the southern interest."

It would appear that

Brown was assiduously following the instructions that he keep
in touch with the developments in the capital.

It is signif-

icant that he sent to McDowell the more cautious of these
two letters.

In all the flurry connected with the Spanish

question no hint of suspicion was ever directed toward McDowell.
To Muter, Brown evidently felt that he could be more confidential.

To McDowell he said:

Separate from Virginia and

Spain will treat with you in a manner advantageous to both
upon the navigation question.

To Muter he said:

Spain holds

that it will be necessary to separate from the United States
to secure the things we desire.
A study of other letters may be a help in arriving at a
decision.

One of the most incriminating is from Gardoqui to

Floridablanca.

He wrote:

" • • • This determination (i.e.

to delay granting separation to Kentucky) was very distasteful
to those who promoted the separation of the district, and
p~rticularly

to Mr. John Brown, a landed proprietor and

resident in that district, who was interested in that matter,
among others, as member in Congress • • • • Foreseeing some of
70.

Brown to Muter -- July 10, 1788. Marshall, the historian,
had this letter from Muter. See Marshall, Vol. I, p. 307.
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these occurrences, I took occasion during the past year to
cultivate the acquaintance of the aforesaid Brown and to introduce such topics as I thought would produce good results.
"Our friendship gradll:ally increased and my sentiments
naturally made an impression on him, inasmuch as they touched
upon those obstacles imposed by our treaties with other nations
which forbade us according any extension in favor of his section
of the country while pertaining to the United States, artfully
insinuating that only themselves could remove this difficulty;
inasmuch as if separated they would afford excuse for regarding
them as an interior district without maritime designs, and
perhaps we could devise some plan of adjusting the markets
so much needed in some of our possessions.

I

carefully observed

his appearance as I told him this, and it seemed to me that
I

could discern the satisfaction that it gave.

I

repeated

(several days later) the same and other observations.

He seemed

quite satisfied and obliged to me, and admitted, in confidence,
that he had, by a messenger who had left some days before,
communicated to his constituents the decisions of Congress
concerning the separation • • • He told me, in conclusion, that
this month the convention would meet and that he expected it
would resolve upon the erection of an independent state; that
he expected to leave this place the 1st of August, and that he
~ould

arrive in time to inform and aid what he had discussed

with me, for he deems it a very fit and important subject for
consideration, and for the present he thanked me for himself
and in the name of all the country, which would be under lasting
71
obligations to me • • • "
Another letter involving Brown was
71.

,

Gardoqui to Floridablanca, No. 279, July 25, 1788.
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written by Miro to Valdes.

ft • • •

Oliver Pollock, a citizen

of Philadelphia, who arrived here three days ago in a vessel
from Martinique, has disclosed to me that Bro\vn, a member of
Congress, who is a ·man of property in Kentucky, told him in
confidence that, in the debates of that body on the question of
the independence of that territory, he saw clearly that the
intention of his colleagues was, that Kentucky should remain
under the jurisdiction of Congress, like the county of Illinois,
and that a governor should be appointed by them for that
province as for the other; but that, as this was opposed to the
welfare of the inhabitants of Kentucky, he was determined to
return home, and on his arrival, to call for a general assembly,
of his fellow citizens, in order to proceed immediately to
declare themselves independent, and to propose to Spain the
opening of a commercial intercourse with reciprocal advantages;
and that, to accomplish this object, he would send to Pollock
the necessary documents, to be laid before me and to be forwarded
to your excellency • • •
Of the Gardoqui letter to Floridablanca it is possible to
make too much.

Assuming that Brovm felt a greater obligation

to work for the interest of the section than to attempt to
maintain its connection with the United States, there is nothing
to warrant the assertion that he was working for an alliance
with Spain.

The letter is largely a statement of Gardoqui1s

opinion as to the impression he had made upon Brown.

As a

glimpse into the character and mode of operation of the
Spaniard it is valuable.
72.

But as proof of a Spanish Conspiracy

Miro to Valdes, Nov. 3, 1788.
(Gayarre, Louisiana, Vol. I, p. 222.)
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it is sadly unconvincing.

In this letter, as in the Miro letter

above, the Spanish officials fail to appreciate the first consideration in the minds of the Kentuckians -- that of statehood.
Organized as a - state, they might successfully cope with the
problem of navigation and market.

But to desire a union with

Spain as an end within itself was opposed to the very essence
of the frontier nature.

It was to that grandiose Spanish

concept that Wilkinson appealed, and the response must have been,
to him, most gratifying.

But in Kentucky were men who were

carrying on the fight for their section's interests in the face
of combined indifference and jealousy on the part of the East
and daring to say and do those things which the occ a sions
demanded.

With the exception of Wilkinson's case there is no

evidence that any of these men expected to profit politically
or financially from the separatist movement.

Indeed their

action might be deemed as springing from an ideal of patriotism
rather than from selfish motives.

The frontiersman has ever

been inclined to put his local community, rather than the nation,
in the foreground of his interests.
Admitting, then, the doubtful nature, in the light of
national interests, of Brown's activities, there is nothing to
justify the contention that he was a party to or an organizer
of a conspiracy.
w~th

Aside from two letters, written in confidence

a request for information, and several letters by

Spanish officials who never understood the situation, there
is no basis for charges against him.

The following statement

by an unfriendly historian regarding the Gardoqui letter seems
totally unwarranted:

"Eve, as she looked with fascinated eye

upon the hateful head and deadly coils of the arch enemy of
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man, did not more easily nor more eagerly succumb.,,73

The idea

so firmly implanted in the minds of the general reader of
Kentuckyts history, that there was a Spanish Conspiracy, is
largely the result of such assertions; the evidence however, is
lacking. 74
Isaac Shelby, the first governor of Kentucky, in a deposition
73.
74.

Green, Spanish Conspiracy, p. 160.
The high place which Brown held and'continued to hold in
the esteem of men of prominence, is illustrated in a
letter from Madison to Mann Butler, Kentucky Historian:
Montpelier, Oct. 11, 1834.
Dear Sir-flI have received your letter of the 21st ult. in which
you wish to obtain my recollections of what passed between
Mr. Brown and me in 1788 on the overtures of Gardoqui
'that if the people of Kentucky will erect themselves into
an independent state, and appoint a proper person to
negotiate with him, he had authority for that purpose and
would enter into an arrangement with them for the exportation of their produce to New Orleans.'
"My recollection, with which reference to my manuscript papers accords, leaves no doubt but that the
overture was communicated to me by Mr. Brown. Nor can I
doubt that, as stated by him, I expressed the opinion and
apprehension that a knowledge of it in Kentucky, might
in the excitement there, be mischievously employed. This
view of the subject resulted from the natural ,a nd wellknovm impatience of the people on the waters of the
Mississippi for a market for the products of their exuberant
soil; from a distrust of the Federal policy, produced by
the project for surrendering the use of the river for a
term of years; and from a coincidence of the overture in
point of time, with the plan on foot for consolidating
the Union by arming it with new powers, an object, to
embarrass and defeat which, the dismembering aims of
Spain would not fail to make the most tempting sacrifices,
and to spare no intrigues.
"I owe it to Mr. Brown, with whom I was in intimate
friendship, when we were associated in public life, to
observe that I have always regarded him, whilst steadily
attentive to the interests of his constituents, as duly
impressed with the importance of the Union, and anxious
for its prosperity. I pray you to accept with my respects,
my cordial salutations.
"Signed
James Madison"
"Mann Butler, Es q .
(Collins, History of Kentucky, Vol. I, p. 328)
Upon the admission of Kentucky, Brovm was made one of the
first United States senators. He had previously served as
United States senator from Virginia.
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in the suit of Innes against Marshall said:

"I was a member

of nearly all the early conventions held at Danville but can not
certify the particular years.

I have a recollection of most

of the important subjects that were discussed.

In no conven-

tion of which I was a member did I ever hear a motion or
proposition made by any member to separate Kentucky from the
United states and form a connection with Spain.

Such a propo-

sition, in my opinion, and the author of -it, would have been
treated with scorn and contempt in every convention of which
I was a member." 75
Certainly not everybody who had discussions with Gardoqui
could be accused of conspiracy in the western question.

Governor

Randolph was evidently in communication with Gardoqui through
Madison.

-In a letter to Randolph, Madison said:

" . . . The

information which you wished to go to Mr. Gardoqui has been
communicated.

The real impression made by it cannot be seen

through the political veil.

If he views the state of western

affairs in the true light, his representations to Spain must
convince her that she has no option but between concession and
hostilities.

It is to be lamented that so many circumsmnces

have concurred to enlist her pride on the side of the latter
alternative. ,,76
In this period of tremendous change and adjustment in
~erica,

the price of leadership was frequently the severest of

condemnation.

Hamilton and Jefferson knew it; Jay returned

to the country following the signing of the treaty with
75.
76.

Deposition in Mercer County Court, August t 1813. Printed
in Brown, p. 166.
Madison to Randolph -- April 2, 1787 (Madison Papers, Vol.
II, p. 629).
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England to be met with a storm of abuse.

But it was the

peculiar misfortune of the Kentuckians that the slander has,
in many quarters, followed them to the present time.

But

whatever· the cost to them, their section received the reward
of their .efforts.

The formation of a new state and the open-

ing of the Mississtppl, issues treated with indifference in
the East, were soon to remove those experiments so fatal to
nationalism ..
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statehood and Navigation Concluded

58

In oonolusion, Kentuoky,

faith~u1

her own interests also, felt that

t~ey

to Amerioa but seeking
oould best be obtained

through statehood in the Union, not outside.

Her leaders kept

an eye open to other possibilities but they never were brought
to the point of despairing of seeing their aims aocomp1ished
by legal means.

The new oonstitution, oombining national

authority with looal self-government held out hopes of Kentuoky1s
aohieving both her aims -- liberty in the eoonomic and in the
politioal sense.

These hopes soon were fulfilled.

Kentucky1s two problems, developing through the early
frontier period together and together threatening the destiny
of the seotion, were brought to satisfaotory oonclusion but
three years apart.

After 1789, the story of statehood lacks

the dramatic nature of the earlier peri04.

Persistence with

patience rather than impatienoe, marks its pages.

The

Kentuoky Convention of 1789 asked Virginia again to pave the way
for statehood.

The Virginia legislature complied; Congress

passed an aot, February 4, 1791, providing for admission on
June 1, 1792.

The struggle was over.

Kentuoky, so long

acoustomed to settling her own affairs quietly passed into
her new position .
The companion story, more complioated, oannot be ade qua t ely treated here.

Its national and international oharacter

made necessary the delays which the frontiersmen had come to
know so well.

The oonsummation of the treaty with Spain,

attempted so many years before by Jay, had several oontributing
factors.

The Nooka Crisis with England had produoed considerable
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uneasiness in Spain. 77

The possibility of trouble with the two

English speaking nations at once was doubly alarming.
Carmichael, the American charge des affaires, had been instructed to hammer ceaselessly upon the idea of a treaty, and
to add strength to our position, France was persuaded to use
her influence in our behalf.
In 1794, came our treaty with England into which the overwrought minds of the Spanish diplomats read a secret clause
against Spain.

Briefly and succinctly has Bemis summed up the

situation when he framed as the accompanying title to his recent
book, "Pinckney's Treaty" the phrase "America's Advantages
from Europe 1 s Distress.,,78
On January 11, 1792, President Washington transmitted to
the Senate the text of a report from the Secretary of State
as to the advisability of reopening the negotiations with
Spain. 79

In an accompanying note, the President nominated

William Short, charge des affaires at Paris, to work with
Carmichael.

Later at the-rather childish request of Spain a

man of "more dignity and rank ll was appointed to head the delegation.

Thomas Pinckney of the famous South Carolina family

was selected and to him is ascribed the honor of the treaty
of 1795.
The settlement of the long negotiation over the Mississippi navigation is found in Article IV:

"It is likewise

agreed that the western boundary of the United States which
77.
78.
79.

For a discussion of this incident, see Bemis, Jay1s Treaty,
New York, 1923, pp. 52-78.
For a thorough and readable account of these later years
of the negotiations, see Bemis, Pinckney 1 s Treaty.
American State Papers, Vol. I, No. 55.
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separates them from the Spanish colony of Louisiana, is the
middle of the channel or bed of the River Mississippi from the
northern boundary of the said states to the completion of the
thirty-first degree of latitude North of the Equator; and his
Catholic Majesty has likewise agreed that the navigation of the
said River in its whole breadth from its source to the ocean,
shall be free only to his subjects and the citizens of the
United States, unless he should extend this privilege to the
subjects of other ·powers by special convention." SO
Spainls contention to her sole right to the navigation
of the lower Mississippi was thus consistently maintained.
The article agreed to by Spain bears more the nature of a grant
than a recognition of right.

The recognition that Spain

tacitly made was, that her period of domination in America
was over; henceforth she must stand aside for the rising power
here.

Kentucky with a spirit now idealistic, now selfish, but

always aggressive, was a symbol for the irresistible march of
the new nation upon the West.

80.

For the text of this treaty in both English and Spanish,
see Appendix to Bemis, Pinckney's Treaty.
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